J. McCutchen

"The destruction of the al-Sadr army" reminiscent of the IDF destruction of Hizbullah last summer. What is it with these Wild American Warhawks anyway? The Saudis will do what we can't just as the Mighty Israelis were going to roll up the Syrians and Iranians in July.

Newsflash. We're fighting Saudi funded insurgents throughout Iraq and have been for three years.

I appreicate your point that Turki more than anyone else help fund the creation of the Taliban and even Al Qaeda. However, during the Lebanese War, before the Bush Administration pulled the plug, the Gulf States including Saudi Arabia backed Israel against Hezbollah. The Israelis long ago learned the lesson, the same lesson the Australians learned from the British withdrawal of Singapore, that far away protectors are far away , do you think the Saudis understand that they cannot rely on the U.S. for protection against Iran and th Shia? And if you do, might they push harder to work out an accomodation with Israel?

Daniel A. Greenbaum

It could also be that the significant shift in Congress here got the Saudis' attention like a 2x4. The developing and future disgrace of the White House, emphasized by the double hit of election losses and the ISG report, means the Saud family's best friends are at risk of being out in the cold for years to come.

Putting the lie to recent propaganda, Democrats won in November and the "terrorists", or hardliners in Iran, lost. That augurs increased contacts with an incoming WH in 2008.

I think there is clearly a split in Saudi Arabia between the faction supporting Dick Cheney and the faction supporting James Baker.

Ambassador Turki was a Baker supporter. He recognized the US failure in Iraq and supported a controlled withdrawal of US forces, communication with Iran and Syria, and a basic strategy that called for minimizing damage. A realist, through and through, insofar as he recognized where Iraq is going.  He knows that even if Bush gets his way, the Administration will only exist for another two years.  At some point, US troops are going to leave.  And when that happens, the kingdom will be largely on its own.

Prince Bandar, on the other hand, leads the pro-Cheney faction that is almost certainly behind the leaks about "supporting the Sunni insurgency" and solidly behind any Cheney plan to expand the war to Iran. This group is not giving up on Iraq. They want the US to stay and the fight to continue. It's not clear if they truly want the White House to bomb Iran, or if they are simply telling Cheney what he wants to hear.   Either way, they are reckless and unpredictable. 

Yes owenz, but if we follow Flynt Leverett's advice, perhaps we can work out a grand bargain with Iran that will begin the process of getting us on the right side of historical political developments in the region. The Iranian people do not seem to be iredeemably hostile toward Americans. We just have to help our governments get over 1979, and work to resolve a cluster of outstanding problems stemming from the Iranian revolution.

As much as the "democracies" in the Middle East seem unfriendly to the West at least part of that has to be because of the perceived belligerence of the US in the region over the past five years. Ultimately, many on the "Arab Street" still have a desire for what they see as the standard of life in the US. Removing the reasons for them to be angry with us may indeed work to create a more democratic society, albeit in Islamic terms, not Western. But I hardly think that is necessarily bad so long as US can be seen as a partner rather than an abuser.

Mr. Nasr:

I am a most pleased reader to see you join the group of contributors in the "America Abroad" section here. I look forward to more contributions from you. Judging from this piece and your posted bio., you add a sorely needed perspective.

I have long maintained that the Iranian mullahs are basically rational actors, not unlike the royal Saudis.  They are calculated, cynical men interested primarily in preserving their wealth and power while increasing Iran's influence in the Middle East and the world.  They are fundamentalists, but only insofar as their political power is built upon fundamentalist rhetoric.  For the most part, they are typical Middle Eastern leaders.

So it's ironic, then, that these otherwise rational actors may find themselves in the perfect storm - caught between the double barrelled extremism of Ahmadinejad and Dick Cheney.  Let me explain...

I have no doubt that Ahmadinejad's electoral defeat was a deliberate attempt by the mullahs to clip Ahmadinejad's wings and reign in his influence and rhetoric.  As you say, Libertine, he has served his purpose and Iran is now in a position to reap the rewards of the Bush Administration's disasterous policies.  They have little interest in a direct confrontation with American armed forces.  They have everything to gain from keeping their composure and waiting for the inevitable withdrawal of American troops in Iraq.

What the mullahs may discover, however, is that Dick Cheney doesn't care if the Iranians are rational actors.  He wants regime change in Tehran, regardless of the motives of the mullahs or the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program.  In addition, the mullahs may find that even a weakened Ahmadinejad plays directly into Cheney's hands by making ludicious statements about Iran's nuclear capabilities and issuing clear and present threats against Israel.  In other words, Dick Cheney is the irrational actor, not the mullahs.  And Ahmadinejad is the perfect "bad guy" for Cheney and the neocons to take advantage of when the time comes to justify an attack (either before or after the fact).  Worse yet, Ahmadinejad knows this and is eager to play the role.  (By all accounts Mr. Ahmadinejad understands the neocon mind exceedingly well...and he probably understands that the best way to cultivate domestic political power in Iran is by baiting the White House into an attack.)

None of this is to say that a US attack on Iran is certain.  But we've heard enough to know it's on the table.  If and when it comes, the mullahs may find themselves shaking their heads...having played directly into Cheney's hands with their nomination of Ahmadinejad.  Of course, they would still probably have the last laugh.  The US doesn't have enough forces for a ground invasion of Iran - so the best Cheney can do is order air strikes.  The neocons think the air strikes will humiliate the mullahs and lead to a toppling of the regime.  Reality suggests the opposite would happen, however.  The Iranian people would rally behind their leaders in a show of nationalism and moderate forces at work in Iranian society would be crushed.

Cutting off electricity by dismatlying towers strikes me as a great strategic warfare move, reduces government power and does not kill Iraqis. A side benefit is that  the dismantled towers are carted off in pieces to be sold and generate new funds to sustain the fight.

At each stage of the conflict Iraq is driven back from the country described at the start of the war, an educated and professional population with some pieces of a fairly modern "infrastructure," of power, roads, universities, industry, etc. Back in the old days Afghanistan was the country with little to bomb. Iraq is sliding towards a place more like Afghanistan than unlike it.

Let us also hope that Prince Turki al-Faysal, the architect of Saudi Arabia’s jihad strategy of the 1980s and 1990s, did not abruptly leave his post as Ambassador to Washington to take charge of the new jihad campaign.

Can you help me understand how you are looking at Turki al-Faysal vs. how Steve Clemons looked at him:

 ... Turki's decision to resign not only had to do with his refusal to tolerate the unprofessionalism of Bandar and Massoud -- but with the signals that Bandar and Massoud have sent to Cheney, David Addington and others on Cheney's national security staff that Saudi Arabia would "acquiesce to, accept, and not interfere with" American military action against Iran.

....This is the core of the deep divide between Prince Turki and Bandar -- which is also a divide between Foreign Minister Saud and Bandar as well.

The tension is about Iran and how to contain Iran. While Bandar and Rihab Massoud allegedly have affirmed Cheney's views and are perceived to be Bush administration sycophants, Turki was charting a more realist course for Saudi interests and advising the White House to develop more serious, constructive strategies toward the region that would produce stability and not lead to "a terrorist super-highway stretching from Iran through Iraq and rushing through Syria and Jordan to the edge of Israel"

Welcome and we look forward to hearing your voice. 

All Saudi Arabia has to offer is funding jihadis! Vali Nasr

Notwithstanding Prince Turki's blustering -- see, Nawaf Obaid's recent opinion piece -- this judgment seems sound. Therefore, should we throw in our lot with the Arab Shi'i elite?

Our concern is oil, and oil is in the mashreq -- the core Arab lands. The question is who will control those lands over the next twenty years or so.

Looking at recent history what energies the Arabs have shown seem to have been expressed by the Shi'i. For its part the Sunna street has been an embarrassment to Islam (it allows itself to be ruled by Alawite heretics in Syria; even in response to the Palestinians' tragedy, it gets only mildly excited; it's riven through with tribalism and factionalism).

South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley would go well with Syria. Kuwait, the Gulf emirates, and the northeastern Arabian peninsula would go well with Basra province. And if the Shi'i get out of hand we'd know where to find them -- and have 85% of Islam behind us if we had to.

Prof. Nasr,

Thank you for kicking off such an excellent discussion. Your essay posted here certainly tracks with the insights offered in "The Shia Revival." I know that earlier you had considered Amb. Khalilizad's efforts to pressure the Shi'a in the Iraqi government to compromise with the the Sunni opposition as a "dangerous" game. I wonder then if you favor the 80% solution advanced by State Department counselor Philip D. Zelikow as the smarter policy option for the U.S. under current circumstances. That option seems out of favor now -- and Zelikow is out -- but it would respond to your contention that "over time the Shia-Sunni conflict can be brought under control only if the distribution of power and resources reflects the demographic realities of the region."